Abstract:

I argue that some important preemptive causal chains cannot be accommodated by a consequentialist framework. While the literature of the last two decades has discussed the question of ethical deliberation in cases of irrelevant outcome, I construct a different case that directly concentrates on the ’comparative’ assumption that underlies consequentialism. The flaw that would be exposed in case consequentialism cannot successfully deal with some types of overdetermination would, therefore, pertain not only to the ’implications’ of consequentialist reasoning, but to the reasoning itself, when it is predicated (as it is) on comparison limited only to the relative value of states of affairs. Consequentialism would thus be exposed as relying on a notion of comparison that does not encompass some moral elements that we expect it to include.

Notes:

Cover Date: 2001.Source Info: 55(2), 155-168. Language: English. Journal Announcement: 36-2. Subject: CONSEQUENTIALISM; ETHICS; OVERDETERMINATION. Update Code: 20150211.